Healthcare Marketplaces, Where Art Thou?

Healthcare Marketplaces, Where Art Thou?

 

At a16z, marketplaces represent one of our favorite business models. Our annual Marketplace 100 provides insight into the latest consumer marketplace trends across industries.

But we on the healthcare team have long lamented: why are there so few scaled consumer marketplace businesses in healthcare? There were four on the Marketplace 100 list this year (a record!)…but healthcare represents on average 12{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f} of household spend. So shouldn’t we have more consumer health companies on this list?

Interestingly, all four healthcare marketplaces on the list focus on finding therapists. In fact, mental health was the fastest growing category by increase in spend on this year’s Marketplace 100. We thought we’d double click on this to understand: a) why mental health has emerged as a viable consumer marketplace category; and b) what other categories of healthcare may be conducive to big consumer marketplaces.

The healthcare industry’s laws of physics

First it’s worth unpacking why marketplaces might be harder to build and scale in healthcare than in other industries. We often talk about the unique “laws of physics” of healthcare, which certainly apply here. These include:

  • The three-sided nature of healthcare (patient, provider, payor), and the related difficulty of integrating comprehensively with insurance across multiple carriers and provider networks
  • The lack of price and scheduling transparency, and the unwillingness of a broad enough set of providers to publish prices and real-time appointment availability for all of their services
  • The infrequent use of healthcare for the majority of consumers, making it harder to have LTV to justify the CAC
  • Challenges around qualification of customers, given the inherent information asymmetry between consumers and providers in terms of exactly what diagnosis a consumer might have, and therefore, what specific service they might need
  • Relatedly, the importance of referral behavior between providers, which can even be a requirement for insurance reimbursement; this can make the provider discovery problem less relevant in some specialties

Robust marketplaces match high volume consumer demand with dedicated supply, giving both sides the ability to transact in a self-service manner. But thus far, we’ve seen more “middleman” models in healthcare–where an intermediary helps match supply and demand, but without true self-service transactions.

Health insurance is an example of this. Insurance carriers maintain proprietary networks of providers with pre-contracted rates–but they do little to help consumers actually find the right provider, book appointments with them, and pay them for their services.

So what is it about mental health?

All four companies that made the Marketplace 100 list–Headway, Alma, Sondermind, and Path–are helping mental health professionals take insurance, and connecting them to consumers who need their services.

Most mental health providers historically have not accepted insurance. They’re often solo practitioners who don’t have the bandwidth to contract with each insurance company, and basic insurance contracts pay less than the provider could make by charging consumers directly.

New mental health marketplace companies propose to handle the complex logistics around insurance contracting and billing, and negotiate better payment rates than providers could get on their own. On the backend, these marketplaces are structured as MSOs (Managed Service Organizations) that deal with the logistics of insurance and other back office support services.

In mental health, the drivers of successful growth have been:

  • Very high consumer demand driven by increased incidence of mental health issues during Covid, and the cultural destigmatization of therapy
  • Widespread adoption of telehealth, propelled by both necessity during the pandemic, and favorable regulatory changes
  • A historical dearth of therapists who take insurance, which has resulted in…
  • …insurance companies that are desperate to expand their mental health provider networks, and are therefore willing to pay competitive rates to platforms that can expand their network coverage

The key element that makes these marketplaces work is the fact that they offer deep supply-side services that benefit both the provider (by diversifying their revenue stream beyond cash pay clients) and consumer (reduces out-of-pocket costs per appointment).

In a space where the consumer matches with one provider whom they see repeatedly, there is increased risk of disintermediation, absent any other reasons to stay with the marketplace platform. But in the case of mental health, the therapist and consumer are unlikely to cut out the platform because that would mean losing the ability to get insurance coverage, as the insurance contracting, billing, and payment operations are managed by the marketplace companies.

There’s also a network effect that drives stickiness; as the marketplace onboards more supply (and therefore demand), they can contract with more insurance carriers and negotiate better rates with them–making the platform more compelling for all sides.

What will make other consumer healthcare marketplaces thrive?

The mental health market naturally exhibits many of the conditions that we believe will drive successful consumer healthcare marketplaces. Those include the following (note that not all are needed for success):

On the execution side, the following playbook for building a marketplace has worked in mental health, and we believe it can be replicated in other specialties:

  1. Aggregating a network of providers: This can be accomplished by providing value-added services that hit a key pain point for the providers, and by offering a network effect benefit that could otherwise not be achieved without being part of a marketplace.
  2. Deploying light “operating system” software: Marketplaces can provide software tools to providers and consumers that assist with things like scheduling, virtual visits, communications, referrals, and clinical data collection.
  3. Plugging into payment rails: This includes payor network contracting and credentialing, negotiating strong rates that could include capitation or bundles, processing claims and payment collection, or offering financing plans for the demand and/or the supply side.
  4. Building a consumer acquisition engine: This can be done through advertising, building a referral network, or creating a strong consumer-facing experience that organically attracts demand-side users.

These frameworks can also be applied to medical products. We’ve seen a few consumer healthcare marketplaces that are aimed at specific product verticals with fairly high repeat behavior, like in the senior care items space, and for over-the-counter health and wellness products that qualify as HSA expenditures. Marketplaces can work well here when physical inventory is distributed across a wider set of suppliers, which makes it more difficult for one seller to hold and offer a wide SKU mix alone. This also often implies that the inventory is specialized (non-commodity items), so the marketplace can help aggregate and even provide additional fulfillment services, such as expanding the supplier’s shipping range or helping them activate automatic reorders.

We see consumer healthcare marketplaces as directly matching supply and demand in a way that the provider primarily owns the patient relationship. This means we’ve excluded platforms where the patient onboards to and pays for the service, and then is matched with or is able to select a provider after the fact.

Learnings from consumer marketplaces

A number of lessons from general consumer marketplaces apply to healthcare. Perhaps the most important is how to get both the demand and supply sides excited about participating in a marketplace.

Patients are worried about adverse selection, and may believe the best providers wouldn’t participate in a marketplace. And providers may feel they don’t need the additional demand, or are concerned about the quality of patient “leads” they’d be getting. We see three potential solutions here that might unlock a successful marketplace model, depending on the dynamics of the specific category.

Category type #1

Quality of supply matters up to a certain standard. No healthcare marketplace has quite the same dynamics as a platform like Uber, where supply has been essentially commoditized. Beyond a base level of safety and reliability, the quality of the driver is somewhat marginal in terms of passenger experience–ETA and price matter more.

However, there are likely some healthcare categories that live close to this end of the spectrum, where patients are looking for a provider that is qualified enough to solve their problem, but the difference in experience between the median provider and the 90th percentile provider is less stark. Lab tests and urgent care might fall into this bucket. It’s important to have these services done in a safe and certified environment, but beyond that, availability, location, and cost likely matter more to the patient.

In these scenarios, a marketplace’s role is to show the demand side that the supply meets that basic qualification bar, and offer transparent availability and pricing information. Uber background checks their drivers and displays a driver’s rating and number of trips completed to the passenger. For a healthcare marketplace, this will likely involve confirming credentials, but also might involve displaying reviews from patients, average wait times, and percentage of fulfilled appointments.

Category type #2

Quality of supply is paramount–and these suppliers can be brought online. In some categories, having the best provider does matter, as the marginal difference between the median and 90th percentile provider is much larger. And getting these best providers to list themselves online is much more achievable than it might initially appear, because the service selection motion is highly elective, or consumer-driven, versus physician referral-driven. An example would be certain elective surgical procedures, like hip replacements or cosmetic surgery; mental health therapy falls into this category as well.

The challenge, then, is to convince patients of their quality. On traditional consumer marketplaces, quality is often conveyed in three ways: (1) objective data, (2) subjective reviews, and (3) the platform’s own (sometimes manual) credentialing of the top sellers. A classic example is Airbnb. A seller’s profile typically includes their response rate and response time (objective data), feedback from past guests (subjective reviews), and, if they qualify for it, the “stamp” of being an Airbnb Plus host who meets extra criteria and quality bars (the platform’s own credentialing).

For healthcare marketplaces, this might include things like special qualifications, reviews or testimonials from other doctors they’ve worked with, or the platform’s own assessment of the provider’s procedure volume and quality of outcomes. For recurring services such as therapy, objective data could include benchmarking around the percentage of patients who rebook or retain with the provider (over a reasonable time period).

Category type #3

Quality of supply is paramount–but these suppliers are reluctant to come online. In this last category, quality of supply is also crucial, but quality suppliers are less likely to want to join a marketplace. This can be for a few reasons, some of which are more “fixable” than others:

Lack of demand generation need

Some providers are consistently overwhelmed with demand–and they will likely be the hardest to get onboard a new marketplace. One wedge is to approach them with SaaS tools to manage their practice (scheduling, automating follow-ups, procurement) or financial services (factoring, BNPL) that can improve their existing business.

Over time, a marketplace may be able to “drip” in new patient leads that they source once they are already embedded in the provider’s practice workflows.

Brand perception

Some high-quality suppliers may be reluctant to list on marketplaces as it feels like a negative stamp on their brand, especially if they are displayed alongside what they perceive to be lower quality providers. An example of this in traditional marketplaces is Amazon, which many premium brands have historically avoided.

In these cases, it almost always comes down to the branding and curation standards of the marketplace itself. Can the marketplace commit to vetting and onboarding only the best providers? If so, there are ways to give providers confidence around this? One example is only onboarding new supply (especially in the early days) via referrals from providers who are already in the network.

Concerns around demand quality

Some providers may be concerned that a marketplace will provide them with lower quality leads, or leads who no-show. From the consumer marketplace world, an example of this is high-end sneaker merchants experiencing fraud on the buyer side of eBay, as described in the Marketplace 100 podcast. These merchants would successfully ship an order–but then get chargebacks on (fake) claims that the sneakers were knockoffs!

A version of this in healthcare has to do with information asymmetry–consumers may not know exactly what kind of doctor or service they need for their condition, and end up booking with the wrong type of doctor, thus wasting a visit (and, potentially, fees) while needing to rebook with a different provider. A marketplace can add value here via “vetting” demand, either manually (ex. a quick call with the prospective patient) or in an automated way (ex. a self-service triage app).

There are likely other supplier protections to be built specifically for healthcare, similar to what StockX did for sneakers in inspecting each pair themselves. This might include not charging the provider for leads that end up needing to be referred elsewhere. Marketplaces could also implement no-show fees to discourage that behavior on the consumer side, as well as features that notify consumers with future appointments who may want to take a sooner slot that gets canceled, so that the provider’s schedule stays dense and productive.

Conclusion

We strongly believe there is a trillion dollar opportunity in becoming the front door to healthcare—the marketplace where consumers go to find and book appointments across multiple conditions and specialties, buy the lowest cost drugs, and even shop for insurance. We’re optimistic that upstarts with the characteristics described above could break out and achieve this in a way that mirrors the success of those that have landed on Marketplace 100. We look forward to seeing more than 4 consumer healthcare marketplaces on the list in the years to come!

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Is A Downturn The Best Time To Invest In Marketplaces And Platforms In Healthcare?

Is A Downturn The Best Time To Invest In Marketplaces And Platforms In Healthcare?

“Our goal is… modest: we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful,” wrote Warren Buffett in a 1986 letter to shareholders about the twin contagions of fear and greed in the investment community.

More recently, the real-world Covid-19 contagion drove investment in digital health to record-breaking levels in 2021, roughly double the previous record. Experts gushed (in large part, correctly) about how a silver lining of the contagion was that it had done more to advance telehealth, virtual care and digital health writ large in 10 months than the previous 10 years.

Gravity is a powerful force, however, especially when combined with rising interest rates, continued war and threat of escalation in Ukraine, and fears of a recession. Accordingly, Rock Health recently reported that investment in digital health dropped a whopping 47{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f} in 2022.

A quickly emerging consensus has arrived among the early stage investment community, summed up well by the recent JP Morgan healthcare conference: focus on profitability, not growth.

The only problem with this perspective? It may well be the dead wrong advice for startups pursuing network effects-driven business models, which underpin four of the five most highly valued companies in the world.

For founders and investors focused on building marketplaces and platforms in digital health, 2023 may be the time to heed Buffett’s counsel: when everybody around seems fearful and focused on playing it safe, it just may be the right time to be audacious (or even a little greedy, using Buffett’s parlance).

Why Platforms and Marketplaces Are Different From (And Outperform) Most Technology Companies

Network effects are often misunderstood, but also fairly easily explained: they occur when the value of a product (or service) increases with the adoption and use of the product by others. There can be “same side” network effects (as in the case of Facebook), or “cross side” network effects (e.g., Uber) in which the presence of one side of users (riders) creates value for the other (drivers) and vice versa.

Both online marketplaces (e.g., Amazon) and multi-sided platforms (e.g., Plaid) take advantage of network effects. Network effects are a simple enough concept, but consider the implications: as more people use the product, more value is created for all, which can in turn attract new users and makes the product itself ‘stickier’ for existing users. As the user footprint itself grows, there are increasing opportunities for monetization. Just one example: from 2007 to 2021 while Facebook grew its user footprint an astonishing 50X (from 58M to 2.9B users), its revenue grew at an even more astonishing 732X (from $153M to $112B).

Consider research comparing some of the largest technology companies embracing network effects (marketplaces and platforms) with their equally large pure play technology peers. The data shows that platforms and marketplaces significantly outperform their peers

  • Grow revenue faster than their pure tech peers (25{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f} vs 10{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f})
  • Are more scalable, generating substantially higher revenue per employee than their pure tech peers ($891K vs $409K)
  • Achieve higher levels of profitability than their pure tech peers (22{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f} vs 16{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f})
  • Are accordingly valued more highly their pure tech peers (4.5X to 3.3X EV/Revenue)

If platforms and marketplaces are so powerful and so clearly outperform their ‘pure technology’ peers, why don’t all companies embrace network effects? There are of course many contributing reasons (including that platforms tend to fail at higher rates), but perhaps chief among them: platform thinking requires a different management paradigm and approach to value creation than traditional ‘pipeline’ business models.

The emerging wisdom for digital health – to focus on profitability – applies to one, less so to the other.

Why Is Now The Time To Invest In Platforms And Marketplaces?

Virtually every startup in healthcare winds up offering some type of discount, free offer, or other form of subsidy early on in their lifecycle. Long and painful sales cycles or the lack of proven outcomes are just two reasons why a startup may trade revenue for something in return: a referral customer, a testimonial, partnership to validate the ROI, etc.

The challenge for any early stage investor is to weigh the economic promise of a company against the massive weight of uncertainty and market inertia; demonstration of revenue and attractive unit economics is one way to do so.

For pipeline businesses, especially those in healthcare, this approach makes sense. Achieving product-market fit in any industry is hard work (and most venture backed companies will fail), and healthcare’s regulatory environment, complex financing and payment system increase the risks.

Just above we called attention to how mature marketplace and platform businesses outperform and are more capital efficient than their pure tech counterparts, it’s important to note that the inverse is also true: in the early stages, it takes substantially more effort and capital to start the ‘flywheel’ process, and both revenue and unit economics are a lagging indicator of business prospects.

This makes sense if one considers the nature of network effects: if the platform gains value with more adoption, then early on there is little value to early adopters and little incentive for prospects to adopt. And even less incentive to pay for the product if the intrinsic value is heavily driven by the presence of others.


In the early stages, it takes substantially more effort and capital for platform businesses to start the ‘flywheel’ process, and both revenue and unit economics are a lagging indicator of business prospects.


This is what constitutes the ‘Cold Start’ problem.

But less recognized that the ‘Cold Start’ problem, which focuses on adoption and value, is how founders and investors should think about the Cold Start from a capital and burn rate perspective. Investors in particular tend to invest in and may actively manage a portfolio of companies; they look for patterns both prior to and following investment, and most of these patterns are driven by pipeline thinking, which constitute the majority of dollars and deals in healthcare.

Hence the tension that early stage platform and marketplace founders may face: most investors will have an eye toward short term macro conditions and toward profitability, while founders may understand theirs is a longer term play and a seemingly high rate of cash burn may be entirely appropriate.

For those contrarian founders and investors who can align on vision, strategy and execution plan, however, now may be precisely the right time to invest in platforms and marketplaces in healthcare.

Why? For many reasons.

First, where competition exists, it is likely facing significant challenges. Belts are tightening, and capital is drying up. And, as described above, there is likely significant tension between management and investors around use of resources. The more conservative the approach, the less likely the long term strategy. Further, the current drop in funding means there is likely to be less competition for a period of time. Forward-thinking teams and investors will take advantage.

Second, forward-thinking investors will recognize that, while first mover advantage can frequently be overstated in importance, they can matter a great deal in winner-take-all (or winner-take-most markets). There is perhaps no greater contributing factor to creating ‘winner-take-all’ dynamics than network effects. Timing matters of course. If a platform can begin generating momentum to get the proverbial ‘flywheel’ turning before competitors, it has more than a substantial (and perhaps insurmountable) head start.

Third, aligned understanding of platform strategy between founders and investors can lead to deep structural advantages. Customers whose belts have tightened are likely to be very receptive to adopting technology that yields an immediate return with no upfront or costs in the near term.

Fourth, the longer growth cycles for marketplaces and platform businesses means that exits are likely to occur in a materially different macroeconomic environment.

We can also look to the past for examples. Uber was founded in March 2009, during the Great Recession. Likewise, Airbnb was founded in 2008. Amazon now is one of the biggest companies in the world, but survived in 2000 in large part because it raised significant capital just before the market crashed.

For forward-thinking investors, now may indeed be the right time to invest in marketplaces and platforms. Is there a reason to think about doing so in healthcare?

Why Marketplaces and Platforms in Healthcare?

Three macro trends suggest we’re at a unique period in time for investors in healthcare.

First, it’s hard to overstate the sea change that has occurred – and also the one that has not yet – as a result of 2009’s stimulus bill. Known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the bill contained massive subsidies to drive physician and hospital adoption and “meaningful use” of electronic health records.

The sea change that happened: EHR adoption shot up to >90{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f}, from under 10{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f} adoption.

The sea change that didn’t happen (yet): meaningful use and interoperability in a manner that would enable improved care coordination, population health management, and researcher accessibility to vast swaths of real world data.

Today, virtually every doctor in the U.S. now practices medicine and interacts with patients while working in an application on a laptop. It is no coincidence that levels of digital health have risen dramatically – and will likely do so again – over the past decade, as investors and entrepreneurs see the opportunity to leverage digitized processes and data, and to deliver on the sea change that hasn’t happened yet.

Second, it’s not news to suggest that healthcare is recession-proof. In fact, recent data suggests that demand for healthcare services actually increases during recessions. In addition, the record $29 billion invested in digital health in 2021 is still tiny compared with the $4T in healthcare spend (of which perhaps 25{08cd930984ace14b54ef017cfb82c397b10f0f7d5e03e6413ad93bb8e636217f} is wasteful), suggesting there remains enormous opportunity to improve healthcare quality and access while reducing costs.

Third, many of the biggest challenges in healthcare are those best addressed by marketplaces and platforms. Care coordination, provider-payer relationships, care navigation, information asymmetry, and price transparency are all examples of the types of challenges created by a complex, highly regulated and fragmented industry where quality is highly variable and trust between constituents is low.

Platforms and marketplaces create economic value by bringing different constituents / sides of users together and enabling exchange. To do so, they must identify where incentives do or can align, bring uniformity and standardization to transactions, and introduce or increase transparency in order to build trust. Doing so is a business imperative, and one that aligns the platforms’ interest with the broader societal interest in making healthcare more efficient, accessible, and higher quality for all.

Finally, while it’s important to note that healthcare is indeed different, that difference can be rewarding for founders and investors. The highly regulated nature of healthcare, fragmentation, highly educated and trained workforce, and importance of clinical workflow can all lead to greater barriers to entry and higher switching costs for customers. In other words, defensibility for companies and investors.

Six Steps For Founders and Investors To Take Now

What to do with all this information? Get started. Although there is no step-by-step guide for founders or investors interested in building or investing in marketplaces and platforms in healthcare, here are six steps that each can take:

  1. Focus on inefficient interactions that are massive problems: Jonathan Bush has said that healthcare is not a $4T market, but rather thousands of billion dollar markets. But it’s also true that many of the biggest problems involve interactions that involve two or more constituents. One easy place to look, for instance: provider-to-payer interactions. Whether it’s reimbursement, network contracting, utilization management, directory management, or hundreds of other transactions, today’s ‘system’ is rife with inefficiencies and lack of trust in terms of how providers and payers interact.
  2. Develop a thesis about how the world should work: Today’s system is still largely paper- or fax-based. And that’s when it’s not being handled over the phone. If there were a common, trusted platform to facilitate interactions, how would it work? Who would benefit? Why would different constituents use it? Who would pay for it?
  3. First things first – build an atomic network: one of the most important things to remember is that reality will differ from your vision in profound ways. Better to figure those things out, and the difference between what works and what doesn’t, early on when the network is smaller, mistakes are less costly. Andrew Chen recommends building an ‘atomic network’, which is the minimum size for a network to survive on its own (See Musk, Elon, re importance of this lesson).
  4. Invest in understanding platform strategy: As described above, building a platform or marketplace requires a different mindset from building a pipeline business. There’s too little platform strategy expertise and experience in healthcare, but there are resources and good books out there to get started. It’s worthwhile to understand the nuances, since not all network effects are equal.
  5. Align on expectations: Among the most important lessons for both founders and investors is for them both to understand what they’re getting into, what it’s going to take to get there, why it’s worth the effort, and what the process is likely going to look like.
  6. Right metrics: The recognition that platforms build value in a different trajectory and have a different revenue profile than ‘pure technology’ pipeline companies should not be taken to mean that money should be invested willy-nilly. If the payout is larger but longer, it’s even more critical for both sides (management and investor) to hold each other accountable for progress. Developing the right metrics to track, and understanding which ones are most important during which stage of growth, is critical.

Be Mindful of Buffett When Others Are Fearful

Warren Buffett has had a decent streak of success since his 1986 letter to shareholders. This, of course, is putting it mildly.

This author doesn’t believe in advocating for greed (and certainly not greed alone), but in recognizing the attractive and long term investment opportunities that remain right in front of us while most are taking the seemingly safer and certainly more well-traveled path.